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THE ISRAELI SETTLER MOVEMENT POST-OSLO

PETER SHAW-SMITH

If Israel's settlers suffered a setback in their grand strategy when the Likud government was voted out of office in June 1992, this paled compared to the blow they received in September 1993 when the government of Yitzhak Rabin recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on a Palestinian self-governing authority in the occupied territories. Suddenly, the icy winds of reality blew through the cozy network of politics and infrastructure the settlers had been building since the mid-1970s, and the national consensus they had, rightly or wrongly, taken for granted over their presence in the occupied territories seemed in doubt. Settlers faced their greatest challenge, but thanks to their work of previous years, they were ready for it.

The Settlers Gear Up

As news of successful negotiations in Oslo filtered through, the Israeli right closed ranks. A "Joint Committee" of rightist parties and movements was established to coordinate the response on the ground. Four political parties—the Likud, Tsomet, the National Religious Party (NRP), and Moledet—naturally gravitated toward this camp, although newly elected Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu set off a crisis of confidence within his party by initially calling for a team of experts to study how Likud should respond to the accord. Alongside the major parties were politically unaffiliated organizations, with the "Yesha Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria, and

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Gaza" (often rendered in English as "Council of Jewish Settlements" or the "Settlement Council") as *primus inter pares*. Other groups were Amana, closely affiliated to the Yesha Council (Amana is responsible for setting up new settlements; Yesha for existing settlements); the Chabad-Lubavitch movement (the Israeli wing of the Brooklyn-based group); Emunim (an offshoot of Gush Emunim and headed by Beit El resident Benny Elon, who also runs the "Beit Orot" Yeshiva on the Mount of Olives in East Jerusalem); the "One Israel" movement; the Golan Settlements Committee; the Betar youth movement (founded a half century ago by Ze'ev Jabotinsky); and various other amorphous groups, such as the ad hoc "Committee to Stop the Autonomy Plan" put together by Qiryat Arba veteran and former Tehiya member of Knesset (MK) Eliakim Ha'etzni. Kach extremists seem not to have been "officially" involved. In truth, the entire movement was, and is, rather amorphous. The "Joint Committee" may well have undergone a number of transformations as aims changed and resources were redirected. At all events, its offices were set up all over the country to organize demonstrations, transportation, and publicity. Young people were ready to participate as needed, and many did not attend school for a time at their parents' prompting.

The importance of the Yesha Council in representing settler interests and implementing a unified settler strategy to confront the Oslo agreement cannot be overestimated. Every settlement in the occupied territories is represented on the council, which is at the apex of a pyramidal structure comprising seven regional and fourteen local committees. Founded in 1979 by Yisrael Harel, who now serves as chairman, the Yesha Council excels at political

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lobbying and at spearheading the media war among the population of Israel at large: its leaders have easy access to the highest echelons of government as well as to the media. Through the regular departments of its Council Executive (a permanent body, as opposed to the more irregular Plenum) it carries out a

host of functions including territories-wide coordination, fundraising, "absorption of newcomers," and "coordinating security affairs."¹ Its actions and statements can be taken as representing the settler movement as a whole. Other groups look to it for a lead. In the wake of the DOP, the Yesha Council had as its short-term aim to rattle the government through mass demonstrations (and, more specifically, to create public pressure that would make general elections necessary). Its longer-term aim was to make sure that not a single settlement was threatened.

Two mass demonstrations against the DOP were held in Jerusalem, the first the week the agreement was signed. Settlers, conveniently forgetting the massive demonstrations following the Sabra and Shatila massacres in 1982, tried to claim that it was the largest protest Israel had ever seen. Organizers declared that a quarter-million people took part, nearly half of them having

arrived in 2,330 buses from all over the country.² When the entrance to Jerusalem became blocked by traffic, demonstrators proceeded to the site on foot. Water cannons were also used to disperse protesters. Yesha Council Executive Director Uri Ariel and Amana General Secretary Zvi Haver were among thirty-three arrested and detained for twenty-four hours.³ The second demonstration was held the week of the Knesset debate on the agreement; forty-five MKs left the chamber to join the demonstrators outside. For two four-day periods, then, the gardens between the Knesset and government offices resembled a kind of fairground—politicians gave speeches, every conceivable organization set up a stall, vendors dispensed food and drink, and youths unpacked sleeping bags on main roads.

Speaking for the government in a bid to allay protests on a visit to Gaza, Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Gur said “settlers (could) sleep peacefully for five years”—a reference to the duration of the interim period.⁴ Meanwhile, the Kach and Kahane Chai (“Kahane Lives”) movements announced that they would carry out “provocations” to spur a cycle of violence that would disrupt the agreement.⁵ Kach’s “Committee for Security on the Roads,” brandishing axes and automatic weapons, mounted patrols on West Bank backroads, especially in Hebron, to terrorize the local Arab population. In a speech outside the Knesset during the demonstration, Eliakim Ha’etzni called for a “non-violent civil uprising” that would fill the country’s prisons⁶ and called on soldiers and police not to “obey manifestly illegal orders to evacuate settlements, to carry out the transfer and ethnic cleansing of the Jewish population.”⁷ The call at that stage was hypothetical, but it is significant that such mainstream figures as former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren later, in December, also called on troops to refuse on religious grounds to obey orders aimed at uprooting settlements.⁸

Nekuda magazine, the settler mouthpiece edited by Yesha Council Chairman Yisrael Harel, summed up general settler feeling in an editorial entitled “Moment of Truth”: “Much depends on us. . . . True, the agreement with the PLO, whatever this amounts to, is likely to lead—in all honesty—to a PLO state in Yesha. . . . It is also true, however, that if there is one actor that is equipped to prevent the establishment of such a state, that actor is Jewish settlement in Yesha.”⁹

Yesha Council’s directorate lost no time in issuing a sixteen-point list of “Basic Principles,” with an introduction stating the council’s intention of bringing about the agreement’s “complete cancellation through a decision of the people.”¹⁰ The declaration ends with the caveat that it was released “without coordination with the government” and that “it remains to be seen whether it will be implemented.” Nonetheless, given the Council’s promi-

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nence, its mainstream coloration and government connections, it is useful to look at the sixteen guidelines, which are as follows:

1. All Jewish settlements in Yesha will remain in place.
2. Jewish settlement in Yesha will be organized in blocs.
3. There will be territorial continuity between the blocs, as well as connecting roads—for requirements of security, free movement, administration, control, and jurisdiction.
4. Municipal jurisdiction will be through local and regional councils according to Israeli law.
5. In every case, the blocs and settlements will remain under the full control of Israel, under its sovereignty and laws, and will be outside all authority of the autonomy area.
6. Between the blocs, and between them and the borders of autonomy, special roads will be connected using bypass routes, under the sole supervision of the IDF.
7. The above will apply also to isolated settlements, industrial areas, and archeological and tourist sites.
8. Israeli citizens will be subordinate to the State of Israel alone, and to the sovereign security forces of the state.
9. The Government of Israel will ensure the development, expansion, strengthening, and security of the Jewish settlements in Yesha.
10. The settlement boundaries will include planning areas of settlements and councils, with the addition of a suitable area of land, as well as areas controlling the outskirts of settlements for ensuring their security.
11. Government Order No. 360 of November 1992 will be canceled, as well as orders which caused all planning and building measures to cease in Yesha.
12. Yesha settlements will be granted the status of confrontation settlements and development areas, in the framework of the preferences of “the Law of Areas of National Priority.”
13. The Government of Israel will not permit a change in the disposition of lands, even private, in Yesha, and will prevent Arab-Palestinian building outside the area of the Arab settlements, and along the vital routes that will be decided upon.
14. State lands near to settlements will be coopted into them.
15. In order to produce a security belt and areas of control both inside and outside settlements, the government will seize lands, even private, both inside and outside settlements, according to security requirements and those of each settlement.
16. Israel will not permit the independent administration by the Palestinian Autonomy Council of security, lands, water, roads, and remaining infrastructure.

The council was also quick to set up new committees to spearhead a territories-wide response. Members of its directorate, as well as Jewish mayors from all over the occupied territories, became members of six new committees (Security, Infrastructure and Development, Political, Finance and Operations, Manpower, and Media). These were later supplemented by two further committees (Internal and Legal).¹¹

The “Jewish Intifada” and “Operation Double”

Settler anger following the DOP had barely subsided when the killing of a Beit El settler at the end of October 1993 triggered a new round of reprisals against Palestinians in the Ramallah area, including stoning, burning, and the destruction of property. Angry settlers announced a “Jewish intifada.” “The time for innocent games is over . . . Now we will speak the only language the Arabs understand—and maybe the government will learn from this the extent of the disaster to which it is leading the people of Israel,” said a settler leader.¹² Under the Yesha Council’s “Operation Roadblock,” thousands of armed settlers blocked roads with rocks and burning tires every morning for a number of days to prevent Arabs from going to work; *Yediot Aharonot* reported on 2 November that over fifty roads had been blocked throughout the territories. The army’s efforts to intervene to allow freedom of movement for all were at best half-hearted.

The situation deteriorated a few days later with the 7 November shooting of the driver of Rabbi Chaim Druckman, a veteran NRP settler, en route to Hebron. Reaction to the killings was such that even the Yesha Council felt obliged to call on settlers to avoid “attacking Arabs who were innocent.”¹³ Three weeks after the outbreak of the “intifada” the army was still at a loss on how to respond to the outbreaks of violence, especially when settlers blocked roads in “prayer demonstrations.” At the beginning of December, settlers accompanied by soldiers were filmed rampaging through Hebron, opening fire on Palestinian stone-throwers. A few days later, two Qiryat Arba settlers were shot dead, apparently in reprisal for the killing in Gaza by Israeli undercover units of Imad ‘Aql, who had become a legend in his own right, and another Hamas fighter. The motorcade carrying the bodies of the Qiryat Arba settlers to a Jewish graveyard in the heart of Hebron in the dead of night was attacked by Palestinians hurling cinder blocks following the killing of a Palestinian at an illegal settler roadblock in the city. Lengthy curfews, more confrontations, and a beefed-up IDF presence in Hebron ensued.

By December, the “Jewish intifada” had, except for “extremist” actions, fallen off mainly to reactions to the killing of settlers. A string of demonstrations brought West Jerusalem to a halt on a number of occasions, although the police always succeeded in dispersing them. Over a month-long period, a few hundred settler activists were arrested. At the end of the month, the action swung back to East Jerusalem, with a demonstration protesting the presence of Orient House in the “heart of the Jewish capital.” In the event, police and border police units almost outnumbered the protestors themselves, with only about 1,000 attending, showing that public motivation in support of settlers was waning. The same evening, organizers, confronted with this weak turnout, called for supporters to proceed to Beit El, where caravans had been illegally positioned. Clearly, the settlers saw home ground as their best battleground.

December also saw the first attempts to implement "Operation Double," which aimed at doubling the number of settlements in the occupied territories by establishing the nucleus of a new settlement one kilometer from each existing one; the reasoning was that if over 140 new settlements appeared overnight, the army would be powerless to deal with them. "Operation Double" was planned by the "Zo Artzeinu" [This is Our Land] movement and led by Australian Moshe Beiglin and American David Romanov;¹⁴ while the leadership and hard core were American, former Soviet "prisoners of Zion" were also prominent in the operation. But the first wave of "attempts" was badly organized, and the Yesha Council, fearing a public-relations setback in the event of failure, withdrew support for the operation.

A more determined effort to relaunch the program started on the Jewish holiday of Tu B'shvat on 26–27 January. The army's arrest of six journalists summoned by organizers to cover the new campaign created a certain public sympathy, although Israel Television's settlements correspondent described the operation as a "field scouts training exercise." Yesha Council leaders continued to express support privately: Pinchas Wallerstein, head of Binyamin Regional Council, said Yesha Council had no argument against the operation in principle, only its timing, and vowed that the population of Yesha would be 240,000 by summer 1995.¹⁵

Meetings with the Government

Meanwhile, the Yesha Council had been temporarily split over a meeting in early November between Prime Minister Rabin and three Yesha Council directorate members: Yisrael Harel, Uri Ariel, and Yoel Bin-Num. Zvi Katzover, mayor of Qiryat Arba and a veteran commanding much respect within the movement, declared that the meeting sent a mixed signal to the prime minister, with whom all were bitterly angry. Six mayors, representing nearly half of the population of the territories, boycotted a Yesha Council Plenum meeting in Ma'ale Adumim,¹⁶ saying that the meeting with the prime minister should have been boycotted. But Harel saw long-term benefits in the meeting, explaining "I think that the pragmatic section of Yesha Council enjoys the majority."¹⁷ Seen as a moderate himself, he never passed up the opportunity to influence the government in the Yesha Council's favor.

During this period, the Yesha Council had been becoming increasingly vocal in supporting talk about reviving "Hashomer" guard units to defend settlements throughout the territories¹⁸ and in plans for the "Operation Double" settlement drive. Newly installed Attorney General Michael Ben Ya'ir, anxious to make his mark and encouraged by Meretz MK Dedi Zucker, declared in early December that the Yesha Council was a "seditious organization." A protest vigil was immediately mounted outside the Israeli Justice Ministry building in East Jerusalem's Salah al-Din Street. Council leaders demanded either to be arrested as charged, or that a meeting be held to clear the air, as well as their name.

Three days later, on 8 December, the attorney general, Deputy Attorney General Yehudit Karp, and State Attorney Dorit Beinisch—the three top legal appointees in the land—met with Yesha Council leaders, including Harel, Yanun Ahiman, David Rotem, Aharon Domb, and Uri Ariel. At the end of the meeting, the Justice Ministry issued the following statement: “Since [the] Yesha Council has made clear to the attorney general . . . the extent of its activities, and its undertaking to carry out the laws of the State of Israel and the rule of law, [he] was convinced that [the] Yesha Council could not be seen as a ‘seditious organization.’ [He] expressed his wish and hope that [the] Yesha Council would ensure that the public struggle of Israeli settlers in Yesha would be carried out within the limits of the law.” The upshot was more publicity in Israel proper for the council, and a kind of government admission of its strength.

Financing

Aside from myriad forms of government financing of the settlements—including a minimum of \$700 million spent across the Green Line from October 1992 to September 1993, according to figures of the Finance Ministry itself¹⁹—not to mention extraordinary tax breaks and the provision of government materials and facilities,²⁰ settlers have been energetic in raising funds on their own. Rich sources of funding in the United States in particular are regularly tapped. It is estimated that millions of dollars are reaching settlement coffers through the “Pro Israel” campaign being conducted by Yesha Council’s “Foreign Desk” since the Oslo agreement.²¹ An undated “Letter to Residents” throughout the territories from the Yesha Council contained the following appeal:

“Yesha Council is working among Jewish communities abroad, particularly in the U.S. and France, in information activities and raising money. [Yesha] residents with friends and relatives abroad are asked to submit to us names and addresses so that we can send them information material. We will endeavor to use this to establish ties with additional communities.” Likud MK Ariel Sharon’s bankable status has been used effectively on television and at semi-private functions during his trips to the United States; guests receive an information package listing needs such as ambulances, sophisticated medical equipment, beepers, clothing for Ethiopians, and are given the impression that settlers live under the constant shadow of “Arab terror.” The cases of needy children are presented. The package also contains a letter from a U.S. government agency explaining tax breaks and one from Yesha Council Executive Director Uri Ariel explaining that “Pro Israel” is the only organization dealing with contributions to the occupied territories.²² Likud MK and Mayor of Ariel Ron Nachman is thought to travel to the United States four times a year to solicit contributions for the “Ariel Fund.”²³

The settler groups regularly tap rich sources of funding in the United States.

The World Zionist Organization (WZO) and the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) transferred \$97.7 million for 161 industrial initiatives and \$24.5 million for 96 tourism initiatives in the period 1987 to May 1992; of 256 settlements to which these bodies transferred funds, only 110 were located inside Israel proper. Of the two funds, the WZO alone was responsible for settlements across the Green Line.²⁴ The Amit Commission, set up in 1988 by JAFI to look into new ways of providing assistance for settlers and settlements through JAFI's Settlement Department, recommended a number of projects. These included an Entrepreneurship Fund, "project-oriented development plans" and infrastructure for "projects of an industrial, tourism or agricultural nature that constitute stable regional economic solutions"²⁵ and were all implemented by JAFI to provide settlers with funding and assistance which cannot be but providing direct or indirect succour to this day.

Looking Toward the Future

Without doubt, the organizational skills of the Yesha Council serve its long-term purpose well; the fact that for the past two decades the odds have been overwhelmingly stacked in the settlers' favor has not prevented them from acting to protect their future with renewed vigor in the past six months. The steady hand of Yisrael Harel at the tiller has steered a narrow but effective course between placating the government and keeping his constituency—which includes extremist elements—happy.

Settlers are also preparing the ground for future annexation of large parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Since large tracts of land have been declared "state land," this seems feasible. The Yesha Council says these areas will eventually provide homes for an additional three million Jewish residents in the occupied territories.²⁶ Gabi Butbul, mayor of Karnei Shomron, put forward a plan for "the annexation of three blocs of settlements" which he considered in keeping with government intentions and likely to gain wide support. These would be the areas:

1. Greater Jerusalem bloc—Gush Etzion and Efrat, Ma'ale Adumim and Pisgat Ze'ev, together with all the Jewish neighborhoods around Jerusalem.
2. The Dan Entrances bloc contains the ridges controlling the 50-kilometer coastal strip "from Hadera to Gadera," where 70 percent of the state's population live. Settlements within the bloc are situated between the two main roads—the "Trans-Samaritan highway" and the Sharon entrances road [i.e., the Qalqilya-Nablus road]—and include large municipal settlements like Oranit, Elkana, Alfei Menashe, Ariel, Kedumin, Karnei Shomron, and smaller community settlements.²⁷
3. Jordan Valley settlements bloc—to which the strategic security cross-Shomron road leads, via Tapuach junction and Ma'ale Ephraim.²⁸

It is no surprise that Butbul dwells so much on the Shomron road; this is regarded as a primary IDF troop supply route. Israel will almost certainly refuse to cede control of this artery, which splits the northern West Bank in

two and is essential to cantonizing the territory. Settlers feel the advent of a Likud government would make plans like Butbul's virtually inevitable.

Even without settler pressures, the government almost certainly intends to delay the relinquishment of any settlement as long as possible. By way of example, there was great commotion when Palestinian negotiators called for the evacuation of Netzarim settlement in the Gaza Strip, even though Netzarim is but a rudimentary collection of caravans. Netzarim remained.

Israel's settlers, led by the Yesha Council and supported by myriad other foundations, associations, campaign staffs, rightist MKs, and a healthy proportion of reserve army officers, have made clear their complete rejection on both practical and ideological grounds of the Oslo agreement and the very concept of land for peace. Settler leaders will continue their campaign, and the chances that they will be deflected from their ultimate aims seem slim indeed.

Postscript: Implications of the Hebron Massacre

On 25 February 1994, a settler from Qiryat Arba gunned down some thirty Muslim worshippers as they prayed during the holy month of Ramadan at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Cave of the Patriarchs) in the heart of Hebron. The killer was a member of Kahane Chai, at the extremist end of the settler movement: the "mainstream" Yesha Council and the more moderate settlers distanced themselves from the atrocity, and the Council assented to a Commission of Inquiry, albeit "on condition that it also investigate six years of Arab terror."²⁹

As this article goes to press, it is too soon to evaluate the impact of the massacre on the settlement movement. Even within Israel proper, almost a third of the population opposed outlawing the Kach movement and 76 percent opposed disarming the settlers.³⁰ In another poll, 50 percent said the settlers even in Hebron itself (some 400 people surrounded by 70,000 Palestinians) should stay.³¹ The Commission of Inquiry began proceedings at the Jerusalem Supreme Court on 8 March.

Meanwhile, settlers were continuing their everyday lives as if nothing had happened, even in Qiryat Arba itself: by their own admission, settlers were free to come and go from the settlement despite the "closure" imposed on it by the army. Demands that the settlers be disarmed were met with exhortations to the settlers by Yesha leaders to refuse to obey if asked to hand over their weapons to the authorities.³² The measures announced to contain Jewish extremists were almost entirely limited to members of Kach and "Kahane Chai"—about 400 persons—in no way hobbling the Yesha Council and its satellites. Indeed, within the first weeks following the massacre, administrative detention had been imposed on seven individuals, eighteen were deprived of their IDF-issued weapons, and a hundred or so had been barred from doing army service.

In sum, settlers reacted to the outcry over the Hebron massacre with characteristic bravado, born of their knowledge that the authorities would be unlikely to take serious steps to limit the freedom of action of over 130,000 of its citizens. Calls for some sort of response, particularly from the Meretz faction in the government, seemed to indicate that stronger measures might be considered. However, in the words of Israel's leading academic on extremism, the likely outcome of government measures against settlers would probably be much simpler: "Nothing. The government does not have the political muscle to act decisively."³³

NOTES

(All translations from Hebrew are the author's own.)

1. An undated Yesha Council Foreign Desk Information sheet (in English) reads as follows:

The Yesha Council

The Yesha Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is the umbrella organization representing all of the Jewish residents living in the areas of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (YESHA). The 143 towns, villages, and cities represented on the council are organized into seven regional and fourteen local councils . . . The Council is composed of two basic institutions: the Council Executive and the Council Plenum . . .

The Council Executive is the body responsible for administering the operations of the Council. Its members consist of the heads of all regional and local councils, together with a number of public figures elected by the Council Executive . . .

The Council Plenum is a representative body whose members are selected from all towns and villages in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The Plenum convenes [less frequently than the Executive] to deliberate on fundamental issues and to make decisions that are binding upon the Council Executive.

Activities of the Council

Political Functions: Representation of the various towns and villages in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza on general policy matters, particularly those which concern the future development of the Judea, Samaria, and Gaza regions.

Absorption of Newcomers: Organization and implementation of programs to direct and assist Israelis in establishing homes in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza in coordination with government institutions, settlement movements, and other organizations involved in expanding the Jewish population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Municipal Affairs: Coordination among the constituent councils on various municipal is-

suues and handling application of Israeli law to Jewish residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Humanitarian Concerns: Securing of philanthropic funding for education, health, social, and charitable needs. The [settlements], of YESHA receive no funding for their humanitarian needs from any of the major philanthropic organizations such as the U[nited] J[ewish] A[ppel] and J[ewish] N[ational] F[und].

Foreign Desk:

—Promotion and organization of public relations activities among Israeli residents, representatives of the local and foreign media.

—Dissemination of information and articles in Hebrew and foreign languages about events in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as well as about the history and background of the Jewish settlement program.

—Conducting tours and visits by Israelis, tourists, diplomats, politicians and opinion-makers from Israel and abroad . . .

Security: The Council is responsible for coordinating security affairs on a regular basis in the towns and villages of the area, coordination of regional security officials and maintenance of regular contact with the [Israel] D[efense] F[orces] and other security forces. The security department is headed by Brigadier General Yosef Kohler.

2. *Ha'Aretz*, 8 September 1993.

3. *Ha'Aretz*, 9 September 1993.

4. *Ha'Aretz*, 7 September 1993.

5. *Ha'Aretz*, 10 September 1993.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ha'Aretz*, 22 September 1993.

8. *Jerusalem Post*, 20 December 1993.

9. *Nekuda*, No. 172, October 1993, p. 10.

10. For the full text of the declaration, see *ibid.*, p. 11.

11. Yesha Council, "Letter to the Residents," Nos. 2 and 3; undated.

12. *Yediot Aharonot*, 1 November 1993.

13. *Ha'Aretz*, 18 November 1993.

14. *Ha'Aretz*, 6 February 1994.

15. *Ha'Aretz*, 28 January 1994.

16. *Yediot Aharonot*, 10 November 1993.
17. *Kol Ha'ir*, 19 November 1993.
18. *B'Gush Ehad* (newspaper of the Gaza coast settlements), 8 December 1993.
19. Ya'ir Fidel, "Why is Uri Ariel Polite?," *Hadashot*, 29 October 1993. [This very detailed article on Israeli funding of settlements is published almost in its entirety in the "Settlement Monitor" section of this issue—Ed.]
20. See also Peace Now, "The Real Map"—Report No. 5 by the Peace Now Settlement Watch Committee, (November) 1992, pp. 28-29.
21. Zvi Galit, "The Yesha Appeal," *Yediot Aharonot*, 28 January 1994.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency for Israel, "Settlement: Facing the Coming Decade," information pack; undated.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Zvi Galit, "The Yesha Appeal."
27. In fact, both Ariel and Kedumin lie just outside the horizontal band Butbul wants annexed.
28. *Nekuda*, No. 172, October 1993, p. 63.
29. *Ha'Aretz*, 28 February 1994.
30. Dahaf poll in *Yediot Aharonot*, 28 February 1994.
31. *Middle East International*, no. 470, 4 March 1994, p. 3.
32. *Ha'Aretz*, 4 March 1994.
33. Author's interview with Ehud Sprinzak of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1 March 1994.